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Empathy, as derived sensitivity, has its place in philosophie coneern as an essential ingredient in ethieal thinldng. Neither the Kantian prohibition against using others as means nor the possibility of knowing the other ean be intelligible without an operative notion of empathy. The topie of this paper is a philosophie diseussion ofempathy. I have argued elsewhere that Husserl's aeeount, in the fifth ofhis Cartesian Meditations, ofthe eonstitution ofthe other as other subject, an "other mind", is persuasive.1 That very technieal issue in Husserlian scholarship eanbe overlooked for the purposes of this paper. Likewise, the positivistic analogue, the problem of other minds, is not to oUf issue. Rather, let us begin with this statement from the second volume ofHusserl's ldeas.
Given eo ipso with t.be act of apperceiving something as human is also tbe possibility of mutual relations, communication, 00-tween man and man. Then also tbe identity of nature for all men and animals. Given furthermore are tbe more simple and more complexsocial connections, friendships, marriages, unions; these are connections instituted OOtween men ....
2
Husserlian phenomenology begins with the fact ofeommunieation with other minds and asks how it is possible? The faeulty ofempathy allows me insight into the other's life whieh I eannot achieve in any direct evidence. I eannot feel the other's toothaehe or see the color red through his eyes. Nevertheless, I have empathetie experienee of other persons. What acts of eonseiousness ean bring this empathy about?
We eommunieate, more or less weIl, with others. We enter in10
reciprocal relations with others in social and familial structures. These may be more or less formal, e.g. teacher/student, or extremely personal in a marriage or friendship. More complex cultural connections, "communities of higher orders," assurne others as other humans with the human potential to enter into communication and association. In the phenomenological fashion, then, let us fIrst simply reflect on aspects of empathy which we have experienced, leaving aside the more thomy epistemological questions for another time. Empathic experience comes to us often in the ordinary course of our lives. For instance, thoughtfulness manifests a studied empathy when the good hostess anticipates our wants. Even this little example shows how experience brings further questions. The rest of my paper will be directed toward answering these questions by describing the process of empathy, its significance in elaborating the content of other minds, and the place of empathy in ethics. Section 1. Empathy Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein are two phenomenologists who have made significant contributions to the theory of empathy. Husserl held that empathy, properly speaking, involves the prior recognition of separateness since, withoutconstituting human objects as human subjects, as other minds if you will, there is no experience of aIterity as something to be overcome. Adult humans recognize each other as others, although potentially knowable. Empathy is the process wbich can disclose the other in bis affective states, motivations, and bis temporality. Empathy does not reveal the brote othemess ofthe other; rather, it overcomes the separation between subjects.
One of Husserl' s major systematic problems originates in the difficulty ofgranting thetranscendentmeaning, "other", to aspects ofthe tlux ofa selfexperiencing consciousness. The difficulty in positivistic philosophies of accounting for knowledge of "other minds" who inhabit independently real bodies is obviated by the transcendental phenomenological reduction which suspends existence claims. The body no longer guarantees the othemess of the other, but the phenomenal experience of the other, as other than, must be a meaning for a stream of consciousness (self-consciousness). In Husserlian phenomenology, the possibility of the experience of other egos must be accounted for as a result of the acts of the subject. How can the I know what is other than I?
Stein's general response is that empathy, a unique faculty ofperceptual intuition, is the means for such experience. Stein, Edmund Husserl's fIrst assistant, in her doctoral dissertation of 1917 described empathy as a sui generis conscious process through wbich we make sense of others in their self-experience.
3 Empathy functions as another sense which, like the more usually counted first five senses, delivers intuitions ofpresence in a sensory manifold. Empathy has as its field the sensuous experiences of the other's expressions and gestures, as weIl as the other' s words.
This account of empathy may be rendered less esoteric by recalling Merleau-Ponty's remark (echoing William James) that "The gesture does not make me think of anger, it is anger itself."4 If the gesture signifies anger because it manifests anger, I can understand the Other's lived body to render bis meanings into my own lived life where I react to the other or not. In her commentary on Stein's work, Carmen Balzer reminds us that "it is on the level ofsenses that we have the elements to establish a link with the foreign individual."s Empathy may be a sui generis intuition, but empathic grasp of the other's physically presented meanings is an everyday experience. This experience of empathy remains as the guiding clue after the reduction and, since empathic awareness ofthe other includes the experience ofthe other as a bodily being, the body as experienced remains too, as it was experienced, only deprived ofthe claims to substantial (objective) existence wbich the degenerate metaphysical tradition presupposed.
The above description of empathy opens up its moral dimension. Perhaps "To understand all is to forgive all" overstates the case, but it does suggest one ofthe paramount motivations bebind holding empathy to be a moral obligation. One cannot serve the community of others if she lacks other perspectives on the world. More properly said, one cannot even help the other (or judge bis intention) without empathizing with his meanings.
Note: two streams of consciousness, two subjects, are active here. The subject seeking to know the other has insights into the meanings embodied in the other's gestures. The other's feelings are still bis alone even when the subject interested in empathizing sees into the meanings wbich the other person displays. The hostess may notice the empty glass or the distant salt shaker without deep emotional understanding ofhow her guestis experiencing the distress. Or, deep communication between persons may be possible if they are both interested in sharing their private meanings.
Acts of empathy do not necessarily imply reciprocity, however. In empathy, one turns oneself(more or less, a smaller or wider turn) toward the other in expressive communication. On the receptive pole ofthe dyad, on the other hand, one turns oneself into an intentional ray into the other. The motivation for empathy may be subliminal as, for instance, when one finds oneselfengaged in seeing into the other and mirroring his meaning, passing the salt because the desire of the other has become obvious. The process must be dialectical or this process is the dialectic of "body language," in "crowd psychosis," or in Plato's Republic.
Empathy, although it does not seek empathetic response in return for its acts, can, when it is reciprocal, achieve mutual receptivity. Mutual empathy can be both active and passive when it is completed by a corresponding empathetic partner. The pairing of a couple empathically united (infant! mothering one, husbandlwife, Clint Eastwood and the "bad guy)" involves a mutual overlap ofmeanings. These meanings take their unity from shared values and shared horizoßS. The mothering one prizes the infant and he basks in her good opinion, never doubting her priorities. The adult couple can show themselves to each other within a wide range of affect, becoming partners in mutual experiences. The pairing between them is a pairing of incarnate historical egos, but these egos, although errlbodied and his1orical, are transcendental insofar as they are loosely attached to their mundane egos as players ofobjective roles. The egos ofclose communication are possible egos since they are being constituted in the midst ofthe commerce between the members ofthe pair.
As each is unders1ood, he constitutes both himself and 'the other as his partner. 1becommunication between them pushes the horizons ofthe world apart so that it reenacts the Greek creation myth of Gaia and Uranus, Earth and Sky pushed apart by their children to make the space of the world. The members ofthe pair find themselves overtaken by a shared world in which they can dweIl in the space of things against the mutual horizon extending now to the others of the other and their spaces and meanings.
As many of its critics have shown, the doctrine which accounts for empathy on the basis of simple analogy discounts the individuality of the other person since it claims to know her on the model of the self. The analogized other is but an importation of the self into a different setting. I may know myself, but to presume an other like me is 10 beg the question of knowing the other, since the other person imagined in this fashion is not really other but merely subject 10 the same motivations and interpretations that I am.
Empathy is, however, often confused with analogy since my own similar experiences are necessary to provide me with a context in which 10 begin to imagine what the other might be experiencing. I suspect 'that some of the problems which men and women find in understanding each other have to do with their different privileged experiences. Many ofthe relations which obtain between them are reciprocaIly complementary, but not identicaI. In Experience and Judgment, Husserl writes that "empathy is nothing other than a special group of positional presentifications in relation to memories and expectations ...."6 These "positional presentifications" which unite me with the other must be founded in my own prior experiences, although they cannot finalIy be restrlcted to my immediate experience since empathy, while grounded in my own experience, is still not imprisoned by the limitations of the actual life of the empathizing partner. Although empathy relies on self-experience for its ground, empathy permits the other to come to presence albeit more or less limitedly.
The face ofthe other, which, according to Emmanuel Levinas, confronts us with immediate ethical responsibility, does so since it presents itselfin a fullness which empathic intuition can thematize, although never exhaust. Ta the extent that her face presents the other and her ethical claims, empathy becomes a precondition for ethical responsibility and, itself, an ethical responsibility. lbrough empathy, the other can be present to me in bis life which I "read" ofhis physical expressions (including words and gestures) and situate withinhis context. Empathic intuitions are present to me in selfevidence, modified by the words that the other speaks. Such refinements are themselves understood in other interpretative acts.
As Stein emphasizes, verbal communication is different from gestural expression since the word advances its meaning symbolically and ambiguously. We each experience our meanings uniquely; we must translate them into objective speech in order to have any legitimate hope of being under-. stood. The problem oflanguage announces itselfhere. The flexibility, the possibilities of linguistic meaning, demand that words be interpreted in relations. Originary language, as Merleau-Ponty reminds us, bestows new meanings as the speaker interprets extra-(pre)linguistic experience by naming it. Insofar as the speaker seeks to communicate a more or less unique perspective, a sudden insight, a nuanced emotional state or subtle ethical difficulty, she must articulate in naturallanguage. To do so, she translates experience into the language which appresents her meanings and herself. Only by reversing the process, translating the common language into her or his own, can the audience make sense ofthe speaker. Attributing the sense intended by the originator is a function of the process of empathy; such empathy is essential to the give-and-take that fundamentally characterizes human communication.
According to our ordinary usage, linguistic communication and body language play a role in the development of mutual understanding, but empathy is the precondition for associating any language with the meanings that the other attaches to them. In order to decipher representations and symbols, all communication demands at least minimal empathetic understanding. The other, as text, provides me with an opportunity to exercise my empathetic capacity, to appresent his or her affective life.
What can empathic intuition of the other reveal? Empathic process occurs along a continuum. Like the other senses, its perceptions include a range from vague or fuzzy to clear. Mundane considerations ofothers-as objects in the world awaiting possible fulfillment as persons in intuitive, empathetic awareness-intend the other only as a possible other. Empathy allows me to see the other, however inadequately. At one end of the spectrum, I can be empathetically aware that another person is thoroughly engrossed in an activity which has no attraction for me or is in the midst of a situation which has never surrounded me. In this case, empathic intuition ofthe shape which fills up the ather's space is amorphous, but can be present to me, nevertheless. In Husserlian terminology, the other is present to me as emptily intended.
This empathetically intuited other person is not an object only granted the meaning "that it is." I can have a glimpse, at least, ofher involved as she is with something which I do not feel or have not feIt. Empathy can imagine analogies between my own experience ofinvolvement and what seems to be the other person's. I can dismiss the other's thoughtless behavior 10 me, assuring myself that she has other things on her mind.
On the other hand, in empathy, persons may be very close to each other. If we are close, we share the one space with another person for a brieftime, anyway. Many episodes of these brieftimes are the stuffof friendships and attachments as weIl as of the social construction of the world. The world which is, in the mutual agreement of most subjects, taken as the actual, cultural world is part af the possible world which includes it. Indeed, in empathy with others of different races, genders, traditions, languages, etc., I can enlarge my vision of the possible world which includes all variations of interpretations. If, through empathy, I have understood myself and the other person as each one among many others, I see that each perspective has its place.
How is the text, the other person, read? If empathy is a kind of asense Iike taste since it, too, delineates a sensuous manifold, what field does empathy disclose? Empathy brings about a kind ofsensuous consciousness of the sensual field which the other person perceives, as preliminary to understanding her perspective. Like any of the other senses, empathic functioning can acquire the ability to make finer distinctions, to see more clearly, to pick out light flavors which it did not notice or recognize previously.
The other is a text for and through the efforts of a sUbject. The limit of empathy is the complete fusion which blurs all boundaries. This must be always only a limit, however, since each of the persons is spatially and temporally other or they would be the same. Nevertheless, what convergence of perspectives is possible results from empathic awareness. Empathetically, I live respecting others' uniqueness and the universal claim which each makes upon the other. Thus, I know my self as one-amongothers.
If it is true that onIy one is I, and that others are others, this objectifying equalization by which I become an Other for these Others, an other among these Others, must be accounted fore It is an equalization in the sense that reciprocity abolishes the privilege and brings it about that there are onIy Others. I am an OtheramongOthers. Thus,acommunityofreaImenispossible. 7 Rational sympathy must be founded on empathy since it is impossible for me to feel genuine compassion unless I am aware of whatever acts upon you and the way you experience such forces. The lived cultural world, the arena of all expressions, is clearly not exclusively a moral arena although it can become morally charged for individuals who understand themselves as beings engaged in moral transactions. The world loses its neutral "objectivity" to become more than a world which permits moral actions, but since the world is primarily a shared worId, demands moral action on its moral stage.
The history of the criteria for citizenship in the United States suggests that much of moral development is simpIy, in the fIrst instance, imbuing others with the meaning other "I." The further development required for right moral action is, according to Robert Sokolowski, taking the other's good as my own and, thereby, transforming my empathic actions through wbich I know the other into good moral acts. In bis work, Moral Action, 8 he provides some accessible examples of such transformations. Although cutting the lawn may be morally neutral, a man may cut the lawn in order to spite bis wife who is naggingly concerned about bis exertion in the heat. Then, when she goes shopping and he cuts the lawn, bis action is moral, not good, but moral. Or, a person may invite another person to lunch if they enjoy each other's company. This action can become a moral transaction if the host wishes to express his gratitude towards his friend by providing him with a nice meal.
In both these cases, the intention and the deed wbich embody it are displayed in asingle action which is necessarily shot through withreciprocal empathy if it is to be truly a moral action. Unless the wife knows that her husband is exploiting her excessive concern for him, his act ofspite will fail in its moral intention; it will not hurt her, and he will have only tried to act spitefully towards her. Ifthe friend does not read the gratitude in the lunch, the host feeIs the debt as still unpaid. We recall that for Edith Stein the faculty of empathy is sui generis; empathy is a means for knowledge of the other which makes use of all sensory faculties, but empathy is distinctive from any ofthe other "senses" insofar as its peculiar function is to bring to presence the emotional state which accompanies the other's meanings. The empathy which intuitively grasps such lived meanings provides the context for moral adjudications and reasoning together. Ethics requires empathic understandings and theones derived on the basis ofsuch experience lest the other's actions be misunderstood or our judgments inappropriate. Empathic experience, and the rational sympathy derived from it, represent ethical value and moral responsibiIity since we are eachone among others in the world we share with others.
Empathy reveals that the substitutability ofone for other can be merely formal when there is no substitution possible on the level of lived experienced. If the other lives in my consciousness as an incarnate ego which is other than myself, not as emptily intended, but meant as the bodily being who thinks I'm funny or whose goodness I cherish. Knowing one other empathicaIly allows me the experience to generalize: those of us born of womenaresubjecttothefrailtiesoftheflesh,death,joy, thelifeofthehuman being in all its wild permutations and basic similarity. The essential grasp ofhuman nature, for which empathy provides experience, suggests further ramifications for ethical theory. Empathy is a means to knowledge of the human nature; knowledge of the human nature enlivens and encourages empathy. On such a basis, ethies is possible. 
